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January 24, 2005 U.S.
Edition
Listen to the Ayatollah
The constitution should be written by Iraqis who represent all segments of society—whether they win in these elections or not
By
Fareed Zakaria
Last Wednesday, Mahmoud Madaen was killed while walking home with his son after his evening prayers in the town of Salman Pak, south of Baghdad. In a Web posting, the group that claimed responsibility made clear that it had murdered Madaen because he was the local representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani (the most respected Shia leader in Iraq). Now, this is not the first time that some among the Iraqi insurgency have targeted Shia leaders and tried to foment conflict between the Shiites and the Sunnis. (In its message, the group referred to Sistani as a "polytheist," the extremist Sunni slur about Shiites.) But if the last two years are any guide, the Shiites will not take the bait and retaliate. Such Shia restraint is now the single most important factor keeping Iraq from collapsing into further chaos.
It's easy to foresee how Iraq could move toward much broader instability in the next few months. The elections will produce results that divide people along group lines—Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds. After the poll, the Shiites will gain a majority and the Sunnis, in particular, will feel disenfranchised. This will embolden the insurgency and increase attacks on Shia leaders. The Shiites will retaliate and thus begins the Iraqi Civil War. This is a familiar pattern that has played itself out in other countries. Except that one crucial step in this scenario has not yet taken place: Shia retaliation. This is not entirely out of altruism. The Shiites understand that through peaceful democratic politics, they will come to power anyway. But for whatever reasons, if their current strategy endures, Iraq has a chance to avert outright anarchy.
The man most responsible for this restraint is Ali Sistani, the 74-year-old sage who has almost never left his rooms in Najaf for two decades. But those who have met him describe the ayatollah as highly intelligent and widely read, far more savvy about the world outside than one might imagine. And he has also shown an extraordinary ability to use his power cautiously but effectively. In every negotiation he has carried out with the United States, with Moqtada al-Sadr, with the various Shia religious parties, his desires have prevailed.
Sistani's power will be truly tested after the elections. It is likely that the two main Shia lists will win an absolute majority. A Kurdish politician said to me, "Once they have won, what if the Shia decide that they don't need to share power with any of the losers?" It is crucial that this not happen. Remember, this election will bring into power an assembly that is not merely a legislature, but also is tasked with approving Iraq's permanent constitution. The constitution should be written by a group of Iraqis who represent all segments of its society—whether they win in these elections or not.
I am cautiously optimistic. The Shia strategy is in part a reflection of the realities on the ground. The new government in Iraq, like the current one, will face an insurgency that shows no signs of abating. Cutting out the Sunnis will not help in dealing with that problem. The new government will also have to win over a Kurdish population that will get extremely uneasy at signs of Shia domination. In fact, an overly aggressive Shia strategy could bring together the Sunnis and the Kurds in a tacit alliance. The very force that makes people worry about descent into civil war—Iraq's three strong groupings—is the force that could steer the country toward pluralism.
Right now, fears of the tyranny of the majority are far less pressing than the central problem in Iraq—the insurgency. To deal with it, the new government will have to take a much more overtly accommodating approach to engage Sunni groups. The American strategy toward the Sunnis has been to disband the Iraqi Army and the civil administration (where Sunnis were overrepresented); to write laws keeping out Baathists (who are mostly Sunni), and to promise elections, in which everyone knew that the Sunnis would be a minority. All these actions are seen by Americans in ideological terms‹building freedom. But they are seen by many Iraqis in sectarian terms—anti-Sunni. Current Prime Minister Ayad Allawi has made some efforts to engage with Sunni leaders, but those attempts have so far not worked.
There is much tough talk from some American quarters about the need for an even tougher approach toward the Sunnis, telling them that their time in the sun is over and they had better get used to it. The only problem with that strategy is that it's been employed for the last two years, and has led to a stronger and stronger insurgency that the American Army has no ability to control. If military force were working, there would be no need for a political strategy.
Here again, Sistani seems to have shown wisdom. In the words of one of his aides, "the representation of our Sunni brethren in the coming government must be effective, regardless of the results of the elections." As an Iraqi politician said to me, "There are currently two Grand Ayatollahs running Iraq: Sistani and Bush. Most of us feel that Sistani is the more rational."