Don't Just Rush to the Exit by Fareed Zakaria

February 21, 2005 U.S. Edition

Don't Just Rush to the Exit
It's not just Al Qaeda and its allies who will delight if Iraq becomes a total mess, but antidemocratic forces will gleefully claim that elections lead to chaos
By Fareed Zakaria

On the night after the Iraqi elections, I was a guest on "The Daily Show." The host, Jon Stewart, began the discussion on the previous day's events by saying, "We did it! We had the election. And now we can say to Iraq, 'Goodbye!'" It's not just late-night television stars; everybody seems to be searching for the exit out of Iraq. Dozens of Democrats—from Ted Kennedy to Lynn Woolsey are demanding a timetable for withdrawal of American troops. To be fair, there are many others, like Joseph Biden and Hillary Clinton, who are not. But even centrist Democrats and Republicans talk about the training of Iraqi forces as the magic formula that will get us out. Perhaps feeling the pressure, Donald Rumsfeld said last week in Mosul that once the Iraqi Army had been trained, "our forces, Coalition forces will be able to go home ... One day you'll see very clearly the history you made." But if this obsession with an exit continues, the history that we will make in Iraq will not be worth seeing.

The situation in Iraq is gray. Partisans on either side would like to believe that it is black or white. In fact, while there are some hopeful indicators (the elections were a great day), there are also some troubling ones (the insurgency has had a great year). Things could go well, but they could also spiral down. And the easiest way to ensure that downward spin would be for America to pull up stakes and leave.

Does anyone really believe that America's leaving Iraq will improve the situation there? It will create a power vacuum; the insurgency will get stronger; the Shia might retaliate against Sunni violence, setting off a civil war, and the Kurds could be tempted to secede. Iraq would then be exporting terror and instability. Some Americans might say, "That's fine, we'll be gone." But any withdrawal will take months, during which the violence will mount. The last American forces to leave under these conditions might not get a more ceremonious exit than they did off the embassy roof in Saigon in 1975.

And even if U.S. troops are gone, chaos and civil war in Iraq would deal a body blow to American interests and ideals. It's not just Al Qaeda and its allies who will delight in the mayhem; all anti-American and antidemocratic forces in the region will be emboldened. Whatever you thought of the invasion, to advocate a quick exit from Iraq is neither hawkish nor dovish; it's the foreign policy of an ostrich.

Even the training of Iraqi troops is not the simple fix it is portrayed to be. Once trained, these forces will still need help battling the insurgency. They will still be ill equipped to deter the much larger armies of Iraq's neighbors Iran and Syria. And the newly trained forces will still be largely Kurdish and Shia. A truly national Army will take much longer to build.

The core requirement for stability in Iraq is a political bargain among the country's three groups. History suggests that such a deal can better be made when no one group holds absolute power. An active American—and international—presence can also prod Iraq to respect basic human rights and to keep its bureaucracy relatively honest, its courts independent and its oil revenues transparent‹all critical in these formative years. Of course it's ultimately up to the Iraqis, but from Mozambique to Bosnia to East Timor, outside assistance (and pressure) has made a huge difference.

The biggest obstacle to a productive American relationship with Iraq is the widespread anti-Americanism in the country. That's why some of us were so critical of the many mistakes of the occupation; they threatened to destroy the possibilities of a long-term American involvement there. But I do not believe that this hostility is endemic. Polls suggest that most Iraqis have been frustrated, disappointed and enraged because the occupation failed to deliver to them basic security and a better life. If and when conditions improve, they will see America in a different light.

Remember those often-cited studies that said having a large force to secure the peace is crucial in nation-building? Well, all of them point to another, perhaps even more important, requirement for success: don't leave. During the 1990s the places the United States and its allies left—Haiti, Somalia—were failures. The places where they stayed—Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor—have been relative successes. Look at Afghanistan. It's faring decently today, but were foreigners to leave, it would almost certainly regress, probably into some kind of failing narco-state.

The most outstanding cases of American success at nation-building and democracy-making are, of course, Germany, Japan and South Korea. It is not coincidental that American forces remain in those countries to this day. That model may not be appropriate in Iraq, but we should approach this endeavor with a similar sense of commitment. That will help produce success, and that's ultimately the only sensible strategy, whether or not it produces an exit.