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March 22, 1999, U.S.
Edition

Loves Me, Loves
Me Not
One
day we're friends with Beijing, the next day we're enemies. This is no
way for a superpower to run a foreign policy.
By
Fareed Zakaria
Did
anyone really think that the Chinese were not spying on us? Most countries
gather intelligence on each other, and most major powers direct their
largest efforts against the SRS -- the Sole Remaining Superpower. The
scandal is not that the Chinese tried but that they succeeded. As worrisome
as this embarrassing security lapse is, it also highlights the central
weakness of Bill Clinton's China policy -- the absence of an overall strategy.
Washington's relations
with Beijing are beginning to resemble a roller-coaster ride -- complete
with aftereffects of confusion and nausea. Only last spring, on his first
state visit to the United States, President Jiang Zemin was feted by President
Clinton, the Republican Congress and Harvard University, among others.
On his own trip to China last June Clinton hailed the "strategic partnership"
between the two countries. Last week the ride turned rough. Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright admitted that China's theft of nuclear know-how
from Los Alamos was "a very serious issue." No mention of the strategic
partnership. U.S. policy toward China has become utterly reactive, hostage
to the latest news cycle. Every fresh crisis causes us to go back to basics
and question again our approach to the Asian giant.
What's the solution?
A two-pronged approach. Our China policy should stick to two central premises
-- engagement and deterrence. The Clinton administration has been good
on the first and hapless on the second.
Engagement is based
on the common-sense recognition that China is a great power on the rise:
we have to deal with a country that large and important. It also recognizes
that trade, commerce and capitalism have produced immense benefits for
hundreds of millions of Chinese. Not only are they richer, they are more
free. Economic liberalization has spurred small steps toward a fair legal
system and even local elections. Naturally, these political openings are
limited and the Communist Party is trying hard to maintain its monopoly
on power -- but they are real nonetheless. Washington should always condemn
Beijing for human-rights violations and champion the cause of freedom
there. But imposing sanctions on Chinese exports only weakens the most
vigorous motor for progressive change in the country.
But deterrence is
equally important. China must recognize that it can't muscle its way to
great-power-dom. In the last few years the Clinton administration has
waffled on this issue. It failed to do enough to stop China from systematically
selling nuclear technology to Pakistan -- which helped lead to the Indian
and then Pakistani atomic blasts last May. On his China trip last year
the president seemed to weaken America's longstanding tacit support for
Taiwan. Perhaps reading Clinton's remarks correctly, China has tripled
the number of ballistic missiles on its southern flank aimed at Taiwan.
This move is an unacceptable shift in the regional balance of power --
and the Clinton administration should forcefully speak out and take military
measures to counter it. If Beijing continues to build the "correlation
of forces" against Taiwan, Washington should bolster its commitments to
the island democracy.
American policy
toward China must also fit into a regional context. Deterrence works only
if our Asian friends back it -- otherwise it looks like American hegemony.
And yet for much of last year, senior American officials lavished praise
on China while condemning Japan. It is worth bearing in mind that Japan
is our staunchest regional ally, houses and pays for U.S. military bases,
contributed most of the money to the attempted rescue of Asia's troubled
economies and still has a GDP around seven times that of China.
Engagement and deterrence
aren't contradictory. In fact, they are expressions of the same vision.
The United States must seek to integrate China into the industrialized
world. But it must also ensure that China's passage to power is marked
by peace and liberalization, not aggression and conquest. A roller-coaster
ride is fun in an amusement park, but in international politics it can
get messy.
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