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April 2, 2001, U.S.
Edition

Breathing Room
in the Balkans
NATO's
battle to keep the peace may be stifling the people it's trying to protect.
Here's a way out.
By
Fareed Zakaria
Here
we go again. Like clockwork the latest crisis in the Balkans has produced
the usual flurry of calls to action. NATO is urged to crack down on the
separatists in Macedonia and reinforce its government. In other words,
to get things back to normal. But the situation in the Balkans right now
is far from normal.
Despite
the recent lull in the fighting, Macedonia is unraveling. In many ways
it's a wonder it hasn't happened sooner. Unlike Bosnia, where Muslims,
Serbs and Croats lived and worked together and even intermarried, the
Slavs and Albanians of Macedonia have always coexisted separately and
uneasily. The Albanians, making up about a third of the country, are persecuted
in myriad ways (their unemployment rate is a staggering 60 percent, twice
that of the Slavs; the Army and police top brass are all Slavs; access
to education is highly inequitable). Most Slavs speak of Albanians in
deeply racist terms. Albanian involvement in crime and heroin trafficking
doesn't help the country's image much. In other words, once lit, this
tinderbox has plenty in it to keep the fire burning.
The arsonists
in this case are Albanians from Kosovo, who are supplying their Macedonian
brethren with arms and secessionist support. Things have not been going
well for Kosovar militants. They have been driven into Macedonia because
they cannot operate out of Kosovo, which is now an armed camp of NATO's.
The greater tragedy for them was the fall of Slobodan Milosevic. As long
as Slobo was in power in Belgrade, independence for Kosovo seemed likely
and even imminent. But once he was replaced by a constitutional, pro-Western
regime, everything changed. Now the West's principal goal in the region
is to support the fragile democracy in Yugoslavia. Kosovo's independence
might have to wait. Apparently some Kosovars won't.
Of course
moderates on all sides might prevail. But the recent history of the Balkans
has been that, when ethnic tensions and violence rise, extremists prosper
and moderates lose support. In a crisis, Leninists tend to win. There
is little doubt that NATO's forces could crush the rebellion in Macedonia.
And in the short term they should do so, to prevent violence from emboldening
the rebels and weakening the Macedenonian government.
But NATO
has to ask itself, what are its longer-term political goals? Like the
Ottomans and Habsburgs before it, it is now the dominant power in the
Balkans. Also like those other empires, it preserves peace among dissenting
nationalities. But in the process NATO has become the principal obstacle
standing in the way of the national aspirations of virtually all its subject
populations. In Bosnia, the Serbs and Croats wish to be freed from a unitary
Bosnian state but cannot do so because of NATO. The Kosovars want independence
but are prevented from doing so by NATO. (The Serbs of Kosovo also wanted
self-determination, but that problem has mostly been dealt with by ethnic
cleansing; 200,000 of them have fled into Yugoslavia since NATO's occupation.)
And now the Albanians of Macedonia might well see NATO as standing between
them and their desire for greater freedom.
Of course,
NATO sees itself not as an imperial power but as a trustee, helping its
wards along until they become democratic, capitalist and peace-loving.
These forces might well come to the Balkans, but it might take a while.
In the meantime, is NATO helping matters by preserving the fiction of
multiethnic states? The recent history of the Balkans--indeed, of much
of Europe--is sad but clear: multiethnic states have broken down into
civil war. Ethnically homogeneous states have more often lived in peace
with one another.
Why not
create arrangements that, while giving up on the ideals of religious and
ethnic coexistence, might actually keep the peace? Besides, by clinging
to old borders that few inside them support, NATO is thwarting people's
political aspirations. This is an awkward stance for an alliance that
has made the promotion of democracy one of its goals. And even if it were
desirable, is it feasible? In an age of nationalism no imperial mandate--however
benign--can last long. People soon decide that they prefer their own government,
however bad, to foreign rule, however good.
NATO should
begin to think seriously about giving power to any community that wants
it--in Bosnia, in Kosovo--and perhaps privately urge the Macedonian government
to do the same. The Albanian enclave in Macedonia could easily be detached
into its own entity. Then if the Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia want
to stay separate or join hands, it's their choice. If the Serbs of Bosnia
want to join hands with Belgrade, good luck. If the Croats want to get
in on the new Croatia, mazel tov. As long as it is done through negotiations
and in peace, what difference does it make how many new statelets arise?
All we need is a few new chairs at the United Nations.
Of course,
NATO forces will have to stick around to keep things peaceful. This crisis
should not produce a fresh round of questions about America's interests
in the region or about its "exit strategy." Over the past three years
our commitments have created interests (even though in foreign policy
it should usually be the other way around). NATO is now primarily a Balkan
policing and reconstruction organization. The point is not that it needs
an exit. The point is that it needs a strategy.
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