They Fought for Stalin, Too by Fareed Zakaria

April 7, 2003, U.S. Edition

They Fought For Stalin, Too
If most people in Britain believe Washington is attacking Iraq for it’s oil, then it’s surely possible that most Iraqis feel the same way
By Fareed Zakaria

Predictions during war are a dangerous business. Still, I feel safe making one: don't bet against the United States. For more than a hundred years people have done so at their peril—from Kaiser Wilhelm to Hitler to the Serbs to Saddam Hussein in 1991. The American military has made lightning progress but also encountered real obstacles in the first week of this war. It will surely innovate and overcome them.

It's worth asking, however, why some of the assumptions underlying Washington's military strategy have proved wrong. This is not so much to apportion blame but to make sure that bad ideas don't further distort American strategy. Better to face up to errors now than repeat them throughout this war—and later.

For years the administration hawks argued that Saddam's regime would collapse easily because few would want to die for him and many would rise up against him. This was, after all, why so many of them—Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz—argued during the Clinton years that regime change in Iraq would probably not require any American troops. "The Iraqi opposition is kind of like an MRE [Meal Ready to Eat, the U.S. Army food packet]," said Perle. "The ingredients are there and you just have to add water, in this case U.S. support." This thinking underlay the military strategy, which bet that between "shock and awe" and millions of leaflets telling Iraqis to surrender, many, including "significant elements of the Republican Guard," will "want to avoid conflict with the U.S. forces, and are likely to step aside" (Dick Cheney, two days before the war began).

Saddam’s men—with everything to lose in a post-Saddam Iraq—have proved to be more resourceful and tenacious than the administration expected. This is an odd miscalculation, because the Iraqis have fought fiercely—though not wisely—in every war they've been in for decades, from 1973 in Golan to the Iran-Iraq War to the gulf war. Kenneth Pollack's classic study, "Arabs at War," quotes Vietnam veterans who were stunned at the ferocity of their fire fights with the Republican Guard during Desert Storm.

But perhaps the larger error may have been to disregard the role that nationalism might play in this situation. I write "may" and "might" because it is simply too soon to tell for sure. It is clear that many in Iraq—particularly in the south—would cheer the Americans were it not for fears of Saddam’s still-powerful goons. But people might also have mixed feelings about an invasion by foreigners. Many of Saddam's opponents point out that he worships Joseph Stalin and has ruled using many of the communist dictator's most brutal methods. Recall that one of Stalin's most significant achievements was to harness Russian nationalism when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. By 1941 Stalin had purged the Army, killed millions in forced collectivization and sent hundreds of thousands into labor camps. And yet when Russian soldiers went to the front, they wrote on their tanks FOR THE FATHERLAND AND FOR STALIN. Many were coerced but many fought willingly.

From all available evidence, most Iraqis would be delighted to be rid of Saddam. But some might also watch their country being bombed and invaded and feel defeated, ashamed and helpless. And the foreign power that comes into their land has a complicated image in the Arab world. Across the Middle East—even in Turkey and Iran—American power is viewed with hostility, U.S. support for Israel is passionately opposed and American intentions are suspect. It is possible that Iraqis feel completely differently on these matters than do all other Arabs. But is it likely? Iraqis live under a tyrant but so do Syrians and Libyans. This hasn’t made them pro-American. If a majority of the British people—let alone Arabs—believe that Washington is attacking Iraq for its oil, it is possible that a majority of Iraqis feel the same way.

The picture that many Americans have in their minds these days is of Allied troops entering France in 1944, with a grateful public lining their path. But France was being liberated from a foreign occupation. There are no pictures of the Allies being greeted warmly by Germans—and remember that the Allies were liberating Germany from the most monstrous dictatorship in the history of man. Nor are there pictures of friendly Japanese, thanking Americans for ridding them of their fascist regime.

Many Iraqis will celebrate Saddam's fall. Others will be angered by a foreign invasion. But most will be on guard to see what happens after the war. That is when America will vindicate itself, if it truly helps to build a new Iraq. After all, the Germans and the Japanese did not cheer in 1945 but they were grateful by 1955. America will win the Iraqis over not by what it does in the next five weeks but rather in the next five years.