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April 23, 2001, U.S.
Edition

Tough Guys Can
Say 'I'm Sorry'
Now
that conservatives are in charge, let's hope they can adopt a responsible
China policy.
By
Fareed Zakaria
Amid
the nationwide celebration for the returning crew and the happy consensus
that America prevailed in the Hainan crisis, a few voices on the right
have been asking, "Did we really win?" Conservative commentators William
Kristol and Robert Kagan say no: "They [the Chinese] have won and we have
lost." Some within the administration have been leaking a similar line.
But they are in a minority. Most conservatives have been surprisingly
supportive of the administration's concessions. In fact, Christian-right
activist Gary Bauer argues that had a President Gore sent out the "letter
of two sorrys," he would have been pilloried by the vast majority of Republicans.
Frankly,
Bauer has a point. But this is not simply a case of Republican double
standards. With the White House and Congress in their hands, conservatives
have finally realized that they are the party of government. And governing
is the realm of reality, compromises, even the occasional "very sorry."
Let's not
kid ourselves. This is what happened: on the basis of trumped-up charges,
the Chinese government made the administration squirm for 11 days and
forced several expressions of regret, some of which certainly sounded
like apologies. They did this even though the United States had done nothing
that violated any international law or was even unusually provocative.
American reconnaissance planes have flown that same flight path for decades.
What has changed in recent years is the aggressive manner in which Chinese
pilots have been hassling them.
And yet
praise for the administration is entirely justified. After all, what should
it have done? The Chinese government held all the cards. It had the crew
and the plane. In these circumstances, to grandstand about national honor
and refuse to compromise would have been playing with the lives of 24
Americans--all to gain momentary advantage in a public-relations game.
As the administration is demonstrating, once the balance of power shifted--with
the crew back home--it can play hardball. Its "regrets" have not translated
into any softening of its policy toward Beijing--on the contrary. In the
heat of the crisis, however, the White House wisely determined that extracting
the crew was its chief objective.
So far
Republicans in Congress have supported the administration. They will need
to maintain that alliance because China is the one foreign-policy issue
that could crack the conservative coalition. During the cold war, the
right united under a big tent called "anti-Sovietism." Various strands
of the movement opposed the Soviet Union for different reasons--concern
over human-rights abuses, anti-communism, geopolitical competition--but
it didn't really matter; the resulting policy prescriptions were identical.
Ideology and strategy pointed in the same direction.
But today's
China is more complicated. The country has a mixed record over the past
two decades, liberalizing economically while keeping its nasty apparatus
of political repression. As with other authoritarian regimes that went
capitalist--Chile, Taiwan, South Korea--the surest way to push Chinese
liberalization forward is to encourage Beijing to keep freeing up the
economy, enmesh it in global trade and international institutions and
keep the world's attention focused on its human-rights abuses.
But in
strategic terms, China and the United States are destined to bump up against
one another. Washington correctly believes that it has a role to play
in maintaining stability in East Asia and preventing any one power--read
China--from dominating. China, on the other hand, believes it should have
a rising role in its neighborhood. These two visions could be compatible--if,
for example, China doesn't use force and bullying--but they could easily
result in conflict, especially over Taiwan. It will take hardheadedness
and diplomacy to keep the peace.
This translates
into a strategy toward China of economic cooperation coupled with military
deterrence. It is a shrewd policy but it will prove deeply unsatisfying
to many conservatives. It lacks the fire of a crusade. For those who yearn
for the moral satisfaction of an all-out struggle, it is too (you can
hear the sneer) "sophisticated." But if this approach is complex, it only
reflects the world we live in. Take one example: while all of Western
Europe wanted the United States to help contain the Soviet Union, no country
in East Asia, other than Vietnam, would support such a policy against
China. It would have been like trying to contain the Soviet Union with
Belgium as your only ally.
Over the
past decade American conservatism has shown itself to be ideologically
active, politically organized, operationally successful--but ultimately
irresponsible. During the 1990s, the GOP became a party of opposition,
ready to criticize anything Bill Clinton did, from any angle. But when
given the reins itself--in Congress in 1994--it retained its angry minority
mentality, railing against the world instead of setting about to patiently
mend things. Its leaders talked about revolutions, "counterculture McGovernites,"
and shut down the government. (Which led a friend of mine to ask, "Wait
a minute, I thought they just became the government?")
The Bush
administration wants to demonstrate that conservatives can get their hands
dirty, make deals, handle the political heat and actually govern. So far
they're doing a good job even if they did have to say sorry.
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