Turn Swords Into Ballots by Fareed Zakaria

June 17, 2002, U.S. Edition

Turn Swords Into Ballots
Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Authority, with its many competing militias and corrupt bosses, was tested in crisis-and crashed
By Fareed Zakaria

Last week's gruesome terror attacks in Israel made painfully clear that Ariel Sharon's invasion of the West Bank failed in its principal mission--to produce greater security for Israel. The military strikes, confiscation of arms caches and rounding up of suspects seem to have slowed things down for all of three weeks. But the invasion does seem to have had one important, perhaps unintended effect. In its wake, Palestinians have embraced calls for political reform with unprecedented vigor. And they have done so despite the fact that these calls have come from Ariel Sharon and George W. Bush, neither of whom they regard as friends or well-wishers.

Most Palestinians are fed up with Yasir Arafat, and have been clamoring for democracy for years. But Israel's invasion stunned them into seeing just how weak, ineffective and fragile their government is. The Palestinian Authority,with its competing militias, corrupt bosses and nonexistent services, was tested in crisis--and it crashed. Arafat's popularity surged briefly, but within weeks he was back to his pre-invasion numbers, a measly 35 percent.

President Bush is right to call for a more open, democratic and law-abiding Palestinian Authority. But this strategy will work only if pursued in combination with a serious peace process, not as a substitute for it. Reform without substantive political negotiations could actually be deadly. It will bring into power--democratically, legitimately--the most radical and violent elements within the Palestinian population.

When urging democracy for the Palestinians, it is easy to forget that the forces of opposition to Yasir Arafat and his cronies--the forces of democracy--are often much harder-line than Arafat in their attitudes toward Israel. The younger guard of the Palestinian nationalist movement, men like Marwan Barghouti, urge a tougher negotiating position on almost every issue in the peace process. They criticize Arafat for two things: corruption and accommodation toward Israel. It is true, for instance, that Arafat could not enter Jenin after the Israeli invasion. But that was largely because the crowds were enraged by the concessions he made to Israel in order to get out of his imprisonment in Ramallah.

Empowering radicals could be good. Once in office, they will have to tackle reality rather than spin fantasies. They will have to clean the streets, deliver social services and engage in the peace process. That is, if there is a peace process.

For Ariel Sharon, reform is a substitute for the peace process. Talk about reform means that he doesn't need to talk about dismantling settlements, giving up land and recognizing a Palestinian state--all of which are politically difficult and none of which he will do unless pressed. Reform for Sharon means the installation of a friendly and compliant alternative to Arafat. He tried this strategy in 1981 with the Palestinian Village Leagues, he tried it in Lebanon when he installed the Phalangist militia (of Sabra and Shatila fame). That both experiments failed miserably does not seem to deter him from trying again. Reform for Sharon is spelled D-E-L-A-Y.

But without a clear pathway toward a Palestinian state, the violence will continue and younger Palestinian leaders will get only more radicalized. Without negotiations that would force them to be responsible, they will take increasingly extreme positions. Eventually they will likely be replaced by Islamic fundamentalists. Khalil Shikaki, the pre-eminent Palestinian pollster and analyst, explains that over the past few years extreme religious groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad have been gaining ground. "Under normal conditions, they cannot get more than 10 or 15 percent support. But they do well when the peace process breaks down, when violence grows and when people lose hope," he says. During this intifada, popular support for them has grown 50 percent. "If they replace the traditional nationalist movement, then things could get very nasty. These groups will never deal with Israel. They will keep fighting."

And the war will only get deadlier. One of the scariest outcomes of the April invasion is that since then some Palestinian groups have been attempting not simply terror but megaterror; note the recent attempts to blow up gas plants and use cyanide. "This is the moment for the United States to act," says Shikaki, "while there is still time. If the violence continues, the majority of Israelis and Palestinians will support more and more extreme solutions." Waiting, watching, delaying and dithering will only ensure that terrorists drive events rather than leaders.

Palestinian democracy is a good idea. But let's make sure it is democracy in the service of peace, not war.