There's More to Right Than Might by Fareed Zakaria

July 9, 2001, U.S. Edition

There's More to Right Than Might
Milosevic in the dock should remind go-it-alone Americans why we need global rules and courts.
By Fareed Zakaria

By sending Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague, the Serbian government has confirmed one of the oldest dictums of international relations. "The standard of justice depends on... the power to compel," wrote the Greek historian Thucydide about 2,400 years ago. "The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept." At the end of the day, justice is empty without force.

The War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague is a model of internationa jurisprudence. It has broad legitimacy and carefully designed procedures to ensure that every person accused, even Milosevic, will get a fair trial. Yet the tribunal has been ineffective until now. It took not lofty ideals but power--mostly American power--to make it work. Hundreds of pages of well-wrought indictments and warrants would have languished in filing cabinets had it not been for the decision by Washington (mainly Secretary of State Colin Powell) to block international aid to Yugoslavia until Milosevic was in a jail in the Netherlands. Might made right.

The day before Milosevic was extradited, another important event took place at The Hague. The International Court of Justice ruled 14 to 1 that the United States had broken international law when it executed two German citizens, Walter and Karl LaGrand, in Arizona in 1999. America is bound by the Vienna protocol to inform foreign detainees that they have the right to seek help from their own embassies--a kind of international Miranda protection. It didn't. The United States also ignored the World Court's ruling requesting a last-minute stay of the executions. This decision, barely noted in the American media, made headlines all over Europe.

I can hear the angry objections from Washington already: what business does a court in the Netherlands have telling the democratic government of the United States what it should do? Well, what business does a court in the Netherlands have telling the democratic government of Yugoslavia what it should do? Here lies the central tension in American foreign policy today. The United States wants to create a world of universal values, rules and institutions. But we can't abide the fact that they might apply to us. Over the past decade, with the rise of a world economy and without the constraints of a cold war, these global rules and institutions have been growing in number and scope. It is becoming increasingly clear that we can straddle the fence no longer. America must make up its mind about what sort of world it wants to live in.

Washington has pressed to set up U.N. tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia and Sierra Leone (the last two are still being discussed). It has invoked international law often--when freezing Iran's assets, capturing Manuel Noriega, fighting Saddam Hussein, arresting drug dealers and prosecuting terrorists. American courts now routinely indict foreign statesmen, companies and cartels for all kinds of violations of its laws (something unheard of 20 years ago). Most significant, Washington has established procedures and arbitration panels for trade that trump national laws. You can't have a global economy without global rules and courts.

And yet Washington resists paying its U.N. dues or signing on to the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto accords, the ban of land mines and various other inconvenient treaties and rulings. It objects when arbitrators rule against the United States and is horrified if a foreign court indicts an American citizen. Now in many cases, the United States has strong, sensible objections to international agreements. They reflect the reality that America is in a unique position as the world hegemon--its troops are spread around the world, it is the chief target of global terrorists and it is the country protesters would most like to embarrass.

But the answer to these concerns is not to walk away from the world but to sit down and negotiate. Most American objections could easily produce a workable compromise if both sides understood that they needed a deal. It would certainly be better for these world bodies, which without America are simply debating societies. "What is the point of having an International Criminal Court without the United States as a member? It would be utterly ineffective," says Princeton's Gary Bass, the author of a noted book on war crimes. And while there are many important debates to be had about the specifics--I am wary of the ever-expanding jurisdiction of criminal courts--on the whole, the move toward more civilized rules of conduct among and within states is a triumph.

It also has practical benefits for the United States. Around the world, American power is increasingly viewed as suspect. This is not because of anything the United States has done but rather because of what it is. Great strength breeds great resentment. If America can use international treaties to pursue its policies in such a climate, its policies will be doubly effective. If it can use international institutions to reflect its ideas and ideals, they will take root more easily and durably. Wisely used, international legitimacy can be a potent source of American power, building institutions that will preserve a world of peace and liberty long after American hegemony wanes. Recall another dictum of politics. "The strongest," wrote Rousseau, "is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transform his strength into right and obedience into duty."