Iraq is, of course, today's greatest challenge for American foreign policy. But Liberia might be tomorrow's. Let me explain why.          

Iraq is obviously pivotal to American national security. But it is a one-off, an unusual case that is unlikely to recur. Whatever its critics may claim, the United States is not going to invade and occupy another country of 25 million people and try to transform it. At least not any time soon. But problems like Liberia are likely to crop up with depressing regularity. There will probably not be another Iraq; there will certainly be another Liberia. And we have not yet figured out how to think about or act upon it.      

 During the periodic economic crises of the 1990s, Washington recognized that early interventions had their uses. Doing nothing created a growing sense of panic and risked turning local economic crises into global sell-offs. Thus even staunch free-marketers like Newt Gingrich and Alan Greenspan ended up endorsing financial interventions in places like Mexico, Turkey and Brazil. International economic interventions are hardly flawless, but they have helped keep stable the global financial system. And by coordinating responses through international bodies like the IMF, the major countries have kept costs down and developed some rules of the road for the future--though more could be done.        

Over the past few years it's become clear that there is a political corollary to this approach. There are places in the world where countries are teetering on the edge of anarchy. Neglecting them will not produce world war but might well produce failed states, regional instability, civil war, the spread of disease and even safe havens for terror groups. In fact, in 1999 Richard Holbrooke called Charles Taylor "Milosevic in Africa with diamonds," because like Milosevic, Taylor was destabilizing neighboring countries. (The reference to the Beatles--"Lucy in the Sky With Diamonds"--went unnoticed.)        

And eventually, when the images get unbearably tragic or the politics unbearably chaotic, outside forces intervene anyway. Over the past decade foreign forces have entered Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, Mozambique, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Congo and now Liberia. We do humanitarian interventions all the time. But usually we get dragged in incrementally and haphazardly. As in Liberia.

       One month ago President Bush called on Liberia's Taylor to step down and leave his country. Bush seemed to signal that if that condition were met, Washington would lead a multinational force into Liberia. Secretary of State Colin Powell endorsed the mission a week later. The very next day Pentagon officials balked at the use of American troops, arguing that such a mission would be difficult and ill defined. Finally last week a West African force, headed by Nigerians, entered Liberia. Meanwhile President Bush has ordered more than 2,000 Marines to wait off the coast of Liberia and has sent 10 advisers to help the West African forces. And the United Nations has begun plans for postwar reconstruction that depend on American aid--but no American has promised any yet.      

  The writing is on the wall; the United States is going to get more involved in Liberia. It should do so and do it well.      

  American troops should lead the multinational force. Even now, they can bring the West African troops under their command. It will make the force far more effective, and will quickly end the carnage. The Pentagon's argument against this--that our forces are stretched too thin--is no longer valid. The 2,000 Marines waiting off the coast of Liberia are likely to go in at some point anyway.        

The Pentagon's other objection is that after things get better, what then? For its troops to leave, there needs to be some authority to whom they can hand over power. Otherwise American troops will be stuck there indefinitely. It's a valid concern. In four to six months the Marines should leave. They could hand power to a U.N. peacekeeping force built with many of the other troops involved in the intervention.        

What to do after the fighting stops is always the great problem. In Liberia, as in so many places, holding elections has not helped much. In the last internationally supervised elections, through organization and intimidation, Charles Taylor won. (Unseating Taylor sends an important signal; elected thugs don¹t get a license to abuse human rights.) But the United Nations has become increasingly skilled at nation-building. It is drawing up plans to repair infrastructure in Liberia, build political institutions, restart the economy, nurture civic and political groups and only then, two years later, hold new elections.      

  The model for Liberia is East Timor in 1999. Then a great power (Australia) led a multinational force, secured East Timor¹s independence and handed it over to the U.N. The U.N. helped in the nation-building and then turned over power to the locals in two years. The East Timor model shows that with foresight, good planning and multinational cooperation, a few troops and limited funds can make a huge difference. In adopting it, the Bush administration could show the world a multilateralism that works.

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