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October 5, 1998,
U.S. Edition

Loves Me, Loves Me Not
With
Clinton struggling, does the world really crave American leadership? The
answer: in theory, yes; in practice, no.
By
Fareed Zakaria
A
diplomat from a third world country told me recently of an
exchange he had three years ago with his American counterpart after a
dull meeting at the United Nations. "You Americans have lost interest
in the world," my friend complained.
"You used to be vitally
engaged in every international arena, thoroughly prepared for every U.N.
meeting. Now you barely show up. It's irresponsible." The American diplomat
had a quick response, "You should be thrilled," he explained. "When we
were active, you denounced us for interfering in your affairs and accused
us of neoimperialism. We're damned if we do and damned if we don't."
I was reminded of
this exchange when I watched President Clinton walk into the General Assembly
of the United Nations to a standing ovation. People have interpreted this
rare demonstration variously, some seeing it as a show of support from
politicians for a beleaguered colleague. William F. Buckley Jr. argued
that it was a sign of anti-Americanism, since it was obviously directed
against American domestic politics, the Congress and its concerns. But
most have seen it as a plea from the world to Washington to end its obsession
with the Lewinsky affair and get back to the serious business of international
affairs. Indeed, when asked, foreign leaders from Nelson Mandela to Helmut
Kohl have said something to this effect. The world, it seems, craves American
leadership.
If so, it is a remarkable
turnaround. For decades Washington was pilloried by the Third World for
its "hegemonic designs." On many issues, even European allies sought to
distance themselves from Washington. After serving a stint as ambassador
to the United Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan came to the conclusion
that the United States would have to remain in "permanent opposition"
at that world body. Why now do these same countries speak wistfully of
the need for a global problem solver?
The end of the cold
war explains much of this shift in attitude. The nature and purpose of
American intervention has changed dramatically since that conflict ended.
During the U.S.-Soviet standoff, American involvement in the world resulted
from a push from Washington. Today, it is caused by a pull from the outside
world. Where once Washington sought to involve itself around the world,
today the world seeks to involve Washington in its affairs.
Even at home the
debate about American intervention has been turned topsy-turvy. During
the cold war, American intervention was prompted by strategic and political
concerns, namely anti-Soviet strategy and anti-communist ideology. Humanitarian
concerns usually ended up limiting the scope and incidents of American
interventions. But today it is the idealists who urge intervention--in
Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia--while strategists, like Henry Kissinger,
urge selectivity, caution and moderation. In fact the new interventionists
urge American involvement in precisely those areas where Washington has
few national interests--this ensures that its motives are pure.
But don't get too
comfortable with this world. It will not last; indeed, it is already changing.
We have been living through an era of extraordinary ideological consensus.
During the cold war people disagreed furiously about the purpose of American
intervention. Critics charged that it chose the "wrong side" in local
struggles. Sen. Christopher Dodd argued against the Reagan administration's
support for the Nicaraguan contras, declaring that it was "standing against
the tide of history." For the past 10 years America--and the industrialized
world--has had little trouble agreeing on the direction of history. Even
when people debated whether to intervene--in Bosnia for example--they
picked the same good and bad guys.
The retreat in Russia,
the Asian crisis, the emboldening of Saddam, the return of terrorism,
the rise of China are all bringing discord back into international politics.
Increasingly the major powers, and many others as well, have different
prescriptions for these various problems. Earlier this year, when the
Clinton administration wanted to bomb Saddam Hussein for sabotaging the
U.N. inspection process, it could not get a single major power--except
a lukewarm Britain -- to back its saber-rattling. The Asian crisis has
begun splitting open the consensus on economic liberalization that much
of the world had adopted over the past decade. For the Middle East, Europe
and the United States have dramatically different diagnoses of the problem
and solution.
This age of consensus
is ending for one more important reason--America's status as the world's
dominant power. The world longs for American leadership, in the abstract.
Once it's exercised, other nations have to decide whether they can live
with it in practice. When global leadership, a vague and banal concept,
becomes specific--for example, the bombing of terrorist facilities in
Afghanistan and Sudan--support for it evaporates. It is not that the United
States is behaving like a bully, far from it. It is simply that the historic
suspicion of domination, empire and hegemony is reasserting itself after
a decade-long hiatus. A British diplomat said to me last week. "One reads
about the world's desire for American leadership only in the United States.
Everywhere else one reads about American arrogance and unlilateralism."
Maybe the cold war wasn't so strange after all.
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