October 5, 1998, U.S. Edition

Loves Me, Loves Me Not
With Clinton struggling, does the world really crave American leadership? The answer: in theory, yes; in practice, no.
By Fareed Zakaria

A diplomat from a third world country told me recently of an exchange he had three years ago with his American counterpart after a dull meeting at the United Nations. "You Americans have lost interest in the world," my friend complained.

"You used to be vitally engaged in every international arena, thoroughly prepared for every U.N. meeting. Now you barely show up. It's irresponsible." The American diplomat had a quick response, "You should be thrilled," he explained. "When we were active, you denounced us for interfering in your affairs and accused us of neoimperialism. We're damned if we do and damned if we don't."

I was reminded of this exchange when I watched President Clinton walk into the General Assembly of the United Nations to a standing ovation. People have interpreted this rare demonstration variously, some seeing it as a show of support from politicians for a beleaguered colleague. William F. Buckley Jr. argued that it was a sign of anti-Americanism, since it was obviously directed against American domestic politics, the Congress and its concerns. But most have seen it as a plea from the world to Washington to end its obsession with the Lewinsky affair and get back to the serious business of international affairs. Indeed, when asked, foreign leaders from Nelson Mandela to Helmut Kohl have said something to this effect. The world, it seems, craves American leadership.

If so, it is a remarkable turnaround. For decades Washington was pilloried by the Third World for its "hegemonic designs." On many issues, even European allies sought to distance themselves from Washington. After serving a stint as ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan came to the conclusion that the United States would have to remain in "permanent opposition" at that world body. Why now do these same countries speak wistfully of the need for a global problem solver?

The end of the cold war explains much of this shift in attitude. The nature and purpose of American intervention has changed dramatically since that conflict ended. During the U.S.-Soviet standoff, American involvement in the world resulted from a push from Washington. Today, it is caused by a pull from the outside world. Where once Washington sought to involve itself around the world, today the world seeks to involve Washington in its affairs.

Even at home the debate about American intervention has been turned topsy-turvy. During the cold war, American intervention was prompted by strategic and political concerns, namely anti-Soviet strategy and anti-communist ideology. Humanitarian concerns usually ended up limiting the scope and incidents of American interventions. But today it is the idealists who urge intervention--in Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia--while strategists, like Henry Kissinger, urge selectivity, caution and moderation. In fact the new interventionists urge American involvement in precisely those areas where Washington has few national interests--this ensures that its motives are pure.

But don't get too comfortable with this world. It will not last; indeed, it is already changing. We have been living through an era of extraordinary ideological consensus. During the cold war people disagreed furiously about the purpose of American intervention. Critics charged that it chose the "wrong side" in local struggles. Sen. Christopher Dodd argued against the Reagan administration's support for the Nicaraguan contras, declaring that it was "standing against the tide of history." For the past 10 years America--and the industrialized world--has had little trouble agreeing on the direction of history. Even when people debated whether to intervene--in Bosnia for example--they picked the same good and bad guys.

The retreat in Russia, the Asian crisis, the emboldening of Saddam, the return of terrorism, the rise of China are all bringing discord back into international politics. Increasingly the major powers, and many others as well, have different prescriptions for these various problems. Earlier this year, when the Clinton administration wanted to bomb Saddam Hussein for sabotaging the U.N. inspection process, it could not get a single major power--except a lukewarm Britain -- to back its saber-rattling. The Asian crisis has begun splitting open the consensus on economic liberalization that much of the world had adopted over the past decade. For the Middle East, Europe and the United States have dramatically different diagnoses of the problem and solution.

This age of consensus is ending for one more important reason--America's status as the world's dominant power. The world longs for American leadership, in the abstract. Once it's exercised, other nations have to decide whether they can live with it in practice. When global leadership, a vague and banal concept, becomes specific--for example, the bombing of terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan--support for it evaporates. It is not that the United States is behaving like a bully, far from it. It is simply that the historic suspicion of domination, empire and hegemony is reasserting itself after a decade-long hiatus. A British diplomat said to me last week. "One reads about the world's desire for American leadership only in the United States. Everywhere else one reads about American arrogance and unlilateralism." Maybe the cold war wasn't so strange after all.

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