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October 8, 2001,
Atlantic Edition
The Real World
of Foreign Policy
The
U.S. faces a real crisis, a real threat and real, external constraints
By
Fareed Zakaria
If you read Washington's newspapers and magazines these days, you'd think that we have just passed the D-Day of this war. Pundits, editorialists and television commentators are busy mapping out our strategy for the war on terrorism after we have defeated Al Qaeda. With that small matter taken care of, the armchair generals urge that we quickly move to overthrow the governments of Iraq, then Syria, then Iran and then perhaps Libya if we're still in the mood. It would be as if the week after Pearl Harbor, Americans sat down to plot whom to take on once America had disposed of Japan and Germany.
Meanwhile, the Bush administration is beginning the long, hard process of fighting Al Qaeda, the shadowy network that has been behind almost every attack on American citizens in the last decade. It is trying to find an effective military response to the barbarism of Sept. 11. It is constructing a coalition that will root out and destroy Al Qaeda and its many branches. And it is trying to ensure that the short-term goal of the strike does not impair the long-term war by fracturing the alliance. This is an immense challenge, and one the administration is handling superbly. But in doing so it is already being criticized for neglecting its cardinal duty to destroy Saddam Hussein. Even more offensive to its critics is the fact that it's engaging in diplomacy.
The notion that the military strikes against the Taliban will be easy is absurd. We could, of course, strike at empty camps, declare victory and go home. But this will fool no one. The kind of serious operation that has a chance of real success is likely to be risky. The record on these missions is daunting, from Nixon's Son Tay raid to Ford's Mayaguez operation to Carter's Desert One fiasco to the Bush/Clinton misadventure in Somalia. The administration is right to take its time, gather all the intelligence and strike hard and smart. Success, not speed, is what counts.
The biggest part of this war effort is diplomatic. As everyone from George W. Bush to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledges, the crucial dimensions of the struggle are covert operations, intelligence gathering and police work. All of this requires the active cooperation of many other governments. U.S. Marines cannot go into Hamburg and arrest suspects. We cannot shut down banks in the United Arab Emirates. We cannot get intelligence from Russia except if the Russians share it with us. It's all very well to target states like Syria that harbor terrorists, but Al Qaeda has been smart enough to set up most of its bases in states that harbor them involuntarily, like Germany, Britain, France and even the United States. The FBI estimates that 1,000 of these people live in America. How will bombing Baghdad close these cells?
There has been a debate within the administration about how to proceed and, thankfully, Colin Powell and some others have been able to prevail--for now--over the hotter heads in the Defense Department. The Powell strategy has gained the crucial support of Vice President Dick Cheney, who understands that key allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt will not go along with a wider war against all terrorism instead of a campaign targeted against Al Qaeda. Living close to the enemy, the Saudis and Egyptians know just how complex the battle against Al Qaeda will be.
It was inevitable that the sensible strategy would win out. When America faces a real crisis or enemy, fantasy foreign policies collapse and reality intrudes. You see a similar pattern in our relations with China. In the absence of a crisis, Americans have a fiery hothouse debate over just how we are going to overthrow the evil butchers of Beijing. And then something like the airplane crisis in Hainan takes place, and the administration follows a sober course. In the first six months the Bush administration fired off in several unilateral directions, annoying countries around the world. Now a crisis is upon us and this very team is paying America's U.N. dues, taking matters to the United Nations, telling Russia that we understand its situation in Chechnya, forgiving Pakistan for its nuclear explosions and even finding a kind word for the Iranian mullahs.
During the 1990s the United States lived in a foreign-policy funhouse. With no challengers in sight and a historic economic boom, we viewed foreign policy as a form of volunteer work. We did it, but strictly on our terms. The only constraints we faced were internal: was it politically sustainable domestically? Foreign policy was a luxury, not a necessity.
Now we face a real crisis, a real threat and real, external constraints. No matter how often we proclaim it, other nations know that they are not all equally at risk. The United States is target No. 1. We need favors from them. And they will do them. But we will have to do favors in return. A foreign policy of fiats and ultimatums will give way to one of negotiations and diplomacy. Welcome to the real new world order.