Writing Prose for a New Term
The second Bush term will be less aggressive, less unilateral, less militant and less arrogant. But this will not be due to a change of heart
By Fareed Zakaria

The key to President Bush's victory might lie in a simple historical fact. No American president has lost an election in the midst of a war. Two of them, Truman and Johnson, decided not to run as the country was slogging through Korea and Vietnam, after tens of thousands of American casualties.

But no incumbent president who has put himself up for re-election during a war has lost. So this is a reassuring win for George W. Bush. But it is not likely to translate into a honeymoon or a mandate. Even in the best of times, as former New York governor Mario Cuomo said, "we campaign in poetry but we must govern in prose."

It's not just that this was a tough campaign and a close election, or that the country is divided and Washington deeply polarized. It's that in the president's main area of responsibility, foreign affairs, the world is not going to give him a break‹or even breathing room. Bush faces an ongoing threat from terror groups, a war going badly in Iraq, a stabilization effort-cum-military operation in Afghanistan, a nuclear North Korea, potentially a nuclear Iran and military engagements across the globe from Colombia to the Philippines. And all this is taking place with American military power stretched to the limit by the commitment in Iraq, and American financial resources severely constrained by large deficits. Looking over this list, Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, quipped, "It's surprising that either of these two gentlemen wanted the job."

Most second-term administrations have different faces in top positions. But most also tend to be less bold and assertive in their second incarnation. In this case, it may be a blessing.

The question for many is, how different will this Bush term be from his first? My own sense is that it will be different, but not for the right reasons. The second term of the Bush administration will be less aggressive, less unilateral, less militant and less arrogant in its foreign policy. However, this will not be due to a change of heart, but because the administration will be hemmed in. America is now constrained by the world, a situation largely created by George Bush's policies. Unilateralism, military force and arrogance simply won't work.

If you want to see what Bush 2 would look like, look around—it's already happening. On North Korea, Iran and many other issues, the Bush administration is working with allies, using international institutions, preferring diplomacy to force and being patient. Sometimes too patient. The irony and tragedy of Bush's second term might well be that even if force or the threat of force were necessary—to deal with North Korea and Iran, for instance—George Bush would be a paper tiger. He would not be able to garner the minimal support or legitimacy to make good on his threats. Any attempt at another major military strike, and the United States would truly have to go it alone—perhaps without the backing even of Britain.

It's not that Bush has had an epiphany. Colin Powell has not suddenly convinced Bush that he's right. The neoconservatives have not suddenly relented. Tony Blair will not magically find that he is now truly influential at the White House. George Bush still believes that military force, moral clarity and certitude are the one true path.

But what this means is that we will see only the rhetoric of confrontation—and the reality of accommodation. Bush will talk about not tolerating North Korea's nuclear bombs, but he will tolerate them. He will insist that Iran will not be "allowed" to go nuclear, but he will allow it. This will make for a hollow foreign policy.

It's a cliche, but it's true: Bush needs to govern from the center. In foreign policy as everywhere else, Bush governed for his base in his first term. His idea of bipartisanship was Norman Mineta as secretary of Transportation. One of Bush's cardinal errors in foreign policy was his administration's ABC rule—Anything But Clinton. On North Korea, Powell tried to continue the Clinton policy and was publicly repudiated by Bush. On other issues—China, Iran—the reversal was less public but no less certain. And yet in many of these cases, the Bush administration—after months and sometimes years of attempting alternatives—has ended up pretty much adopting the Clinton policy.

This time, let's try genuine bipartisanship. Bush could appoint a few Democrats to crucial positions—perhaps the director of national intelligence. Beyond people, he should try to incorporate the ideas of some senior Democrats. It would make for greater public support. And it might even make for better foreign policy.

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