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November 20, 2006
Don't Punt on The Troops Issue
The question of boots on the ground is critical to any progress.
Press accounts of its
deliberations suggest that the much-anticipated Baker-Hamilton report
will make some intelligent recommendations. The committee will point out
that America's strategy in Iraq must be placed in a broader regional context.
For three years, America's Iraq policy has largely ignored the rest of
the Middle East. That was no accident. The neoconservative vision was
always that Iraq would be made anew, shorn of the flaws and ailments of
the Arab world. Before the invasion, senior policymakers speculated that
Iraq's postwar government would recognize Israel. "The road to Jerusalem
runs through Baghdad," they were fond of saying. Immediately after
the war, a senior international diplomat attached to the Coalition Provisional
Authority was embarking on a trip to Iraq's neighbors, and he asked Paul
Bremer what message to deliver to them. The answer: none. The region was
the problem, not the solution.
This absence of a regional strategy left Iraq open
to its neighbors' most irresponsible instincts. Iran and Syria have helped
keep the violence there on the boil. Saudi groups and individuals have
funded Sunni militants. None of the surrounding nations would benefit
if Iraq actually did collapse, setting off territorial disputes, sending
refugees into neighboring lands and exporting Iraq's instability. Such
an outcome can still be avoided, but only with active support from these
countries. The Baker-Hamilton commission can be expected to recommend
a major regional effort.
The panel will also surely suggest intensive efforts
to get the various groups in Iraq to forge a national compact. The elements
of such a deal are clear-regional autonomy, a sharing of oil revenues,
amnesty and the demobilization of armed groups or their incorporation
into the Army. And this political settlement would go a long way toward
reducing the violence in the country.
But if the commission stops there, it will have missed its moment. These
recommendations are the easy ones, accepted by almost everyone but a few
ideologues. Some are already being tried. The United States has been pushing
hard to get the Iraqis to make a political deal. The administration has
been talking more to the neighbors of late and has even made some small
overtures to Iran.
That's not enough. Even if Iran and Syria actually
agreed to help stabilize Iraq, there's no certainty that their efforts
would bring dramatic changes to the country. The violence in Iraq has
taken on a life of its own, and the entire structure of political authority
has become fragmented and decentralized. If Prime Minister Maliki and
Ayatollah Sistani cannot rein in the violence of their own fellow Shiites,
is it likely that Iran and Syria could?
Here is the tough question: What are America's objectives
in Iraq and how can we achieve them? More bluntly, what is to be done
with the roughly 140,000 U.S. troops stationed there? What is their mission?
If they have new goals, do these require more Americans or fewer? Not
to tackle this issue is to present a doughnut document-all sides and no
center.
In answering this question, we need to keep three
factors in mind:
- This is not our chessboard. The Iraqi government
has authority over all the political issues in the country. We may have
excellent ideas about federalism, revenue-sharing and amnesty, but the
ruling coalition has to agree and then actually implement them. So far,
despite our many efforts, they have refused. There is a desperate neoconservative
plea for more troops to try one more time in Iraq. But a new military
strategy, even with adequate forces, cannot work without political moves
that reinforce it. The opposite is happening today. American military
efforts are actually being undermined by Iraq's government. The stark
truth is, we do not have an Iraqi partner willing to make the hard decisions.
Wishing otherwise is, well, wishful thinking.
- Time is not on America's side. Month by month,
U.S. influence in Iraq is waning. Deals that we could have imposed on
Iraq's rival factions in 2003 are now impossible. A year ago, America's
ambassador to Iraq had real influence. Today he is being marginalized.
Thus any new policy that requires new approaches to the neighbors and
lengthy negotiations carries the cost associated with waiting.
-America's only real leverage is the threat of withdrawal.
Many outsiders fail to grasp how much political power the United States
has handed over in Iraq. The Americans could not partition Iraq or distribute
its revenues even if Bush decided to. But Washington can warn the ruling
coalition that unless certain conditions are met, U.S. troops will begin
a substantial drawdown, quit providing basic security on the streets of
Iraq and instead take on a narrower role, akin to the Special Forces mission
in Afghanistan.
And one last thing: for such a threat to be meaningful, we must be prepared to carry it out.
