Panic Is Not the Solution by Fareed Zakaria

December 5, 2005 U.S. Edition

Panic Is Not the Solution
Many Democrats are understandably enraged over Iraq. But in responding in equally partisan fashion, they could well precipitate a tragedy.
By Fareed Zakaria

The rising clamor in Washington to get out of Iraq may be right or may be wrong, but one thing is certain: its timing has little to do with events in that country. Iraq today is no worse off than it was three months ago, or a year ago. Nor has there been a sudden spike in the numbers of American troops being killed. In fact, in some ways things have improved recently. What's driving this debate, however, are events in America. President Bush's approval rating has plummeted, battered by Iraq but also by Hurricane Katrina. The Democrats, sensing weakness, are trying to draw blood. But the result is a debate that is oddly timed. Iraq is in the midst of full-scale political campaigning and is three weeks from a crucial election, the first in which there will be large-scale Sunni participation. This will also be the first election to yield a government with real—and lasting—powers. (It will have a four-year term, compared with the last two governments, which had six months each.)

Why and how we got into this war are important questions. And the administration's hands are not clean. But the paramount question right now should not be "What did we do about Iraq three years ago?" It should be "What should we do about Iraq today?" And on this topic, the administration has finally been providing some smart answers. Condoleezza Rice, who is now in control of Iraq policy in a way no one has been, has spearheaded a political-military strategy for Iraq that is sophisticated and workable.

Many Democrats are understandably enraged by an administration that has acted in an unethical, highly partisan and largely incompetent fashion in Iraq. But in responding in equally partisan fashion they could well precipitate a tragedy. Just as our Iraq policy has been getting on a firmer footing, the political dynamic in Washington could move toward a panicked withdrawal.

To oversimplify, after two years of pretending that it was not engaged in nation-building in Iraq, the administration has accepted reality. Instead of simply chasing insurgents or hunkering down in large armed camps, the military is now moving to "clear, hold and build," in Rice's words. If this trend continues, it means that securing the population and improving the lives of people has become the key measure of success in Iraq. This shift is two years late—call it the education of Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney—but better now than never.

To understand the change, look at the airport road to Baghdad. For two years, when reporters would ask how it was possible that the mightiest military in history could not secure a five-kilometer stretch of road, the military responded with long, jargon-filled lectures on the inherent weakness of long supply lines and the complex nature of Baghdad's urban topography. Then one day this summer the military was ordered to secure the road and use more troops if necessary. Presto. Using Iraqi forces, the road was secured. Similar strategies have made cities like Najaf, Mosul, Tall Afar and even Fallujah much safer today than they were a year ago.

The next great shift will have to be the protection of infrastructure. It remains mind-boggling that Iraq is producing no more electricity and oil today than under Saddam. The U.S. military does not want to protect power plants and refineries, but success in Iraq requires it. It is not just a "clear and hold" strategy. "Building" will bring much-needed economic activity and growth.

On the political front, the overtures to Sunnis have yielded some results. Last week in Cairo, the Sunnis pushed through a united Iraqi position that included support for the right of resistance. It's purely symbolic. The Sunni leaders I talked to in Baghdad are well aware that if American forces left tomorrow, the insurgents would kill them all. But the outcome bolstered their nationalist credentials and also brought in other Arab states that so far have been sitting on the sidelines. That Washington did not overreact to the hot air coming out of Cairo is a sign of its new maturity.

If Washington's strategy is more aggressively pursued, it could actually be compatible with some American troop withdrawals. For obvious political reasons, it would be far better if the "hold" part of the policy was done by Iraqi forces. And, in fact, this has been happening. Najaf and Mosul are now patrolled entirely by Iraqi Army forces. Even Kirkuk, which is politically sensitive, has fewer American troops in it than it did six months ago. This trend could accelerate, which would mean that three or four brigades could be withdrawn in the next year.

Current talk of a withdrawal, properly done, could actually serve a useful purpose. The most dysfunctional aspect of Iraq right now is its government. The Shia leaders don't agree on much. They refuse to listen to the United States on issues ranging from subsidizing energy (a large part of the reason oil supply is so weak) to making concessions to the Sunnis. If Iraq's leaders begin to realize that they could be on their own, without the United States to blame and without the American Army to protect them, they might have a greater incentive to start making tough decisions.

But for any of this to work, the United States needs to be able to maintain a stable set of policies in Iraq that do not appear to be the product of panic or politics. That alone will yield success, which will allow American troops to return home having achieved something. As has often been pointed out, the key here is not the exit, but the strategy.