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December 6, 2004, U.S.
Edition
Tag-Teaming the Mullahs
Military strikes would do limited damage to Iran's nuclear facilities, rally the country round the regime and isolate Washington
By
Fareed Zakaria
Anyone who tells you that he has a clear solution to the problem posed by Iran's nuclear ambitions is not being honest. It's about as tough as foreign-policy problems get. There are two basic approaches to prevent Iran from going nuclear: coercion and engagement. Both have serious flaws. But for either to have even a chance of working, the crucial player will not be America, but Europe.
If coercion means American military strikes, it is an utterly counterproductive idea. Such a move would do limited damage to Iran's nuclear facilities, rally the country round the regime, isolate the United States further in the world and probably prompt the Iranians to retaliate by sponsoring terror attacks against our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The United States has often faltered by not appreciating the strength of nationalism around the world—most recently in Iraq. Iranian nationalism is particularly strong. Iranians have long harbored deep suspicions about foreigners and particularly Americans. It was Iran, under the liberal Prime Minister Mossadeq, that first nationalized its oil industry. It was Iran, under the pro-American shah, that initiated the oil hikes of 1973. And it is Iran that remains the only Middle Eastern country to have deposed a regime largely because it was pro-American. American military strikes will not be welcomed by the population.
The strategy behind strikes, for many Washington hawks, is not disarmament but regime change. They hope that by turning up the heat we will topple the current regime, which they believe is teetering on the edge. But this seems highly unlikely. Iranians are clearly unhappy with the corrupt and dictatorial regime they live under. They are also, however, wary of revolutions, having suffered through one for the last 25 years. Iranian protesters and reformers have hoped for greater mass action than they have gotten. The regime for its part has found a way to use Iran's vast oil revenues to create a large patronage network and to bribe the Army and secret police. One day this evil regime will pass from the scene. But long before that, Iran will go nuclear. A long-term vision will not solve a short-term danger.
If military strikes are not a good option, engagement isn't great, either. Some say that we aren't offering Iran real rewards. Perhaps that's true. They say that the Bush administration is unwilling to offer a "grand bargain"—normal relations with the United States in return for no nukes. Also true. But there is little evidence that better U.S. policy would produce an Iranian response. As Kenneth Pollack writes in his fine new book, "The Persian Puzzle," "It is the Iranian government that has consistently rejected engagement with the United States, whereas the U.S. has been ready for the Grand Bargain for twenty years." Recall that it was Ronald Reagan who sent the Iranians a cake, a Bible and his national-security adviser, hoping to begin a thaw. But many in Tehran believed—and still believe—that confrontation with the United States benefits them.
That's where Europe comes in. So far Tehran has not really borne much of a cost for its behavior. American sanctions have been toothless because the rest of the world eagerly trades with Iran. As the Iranians often point out, it is not they who are isolated but the Americans. Europe has now joined hands with the United States and is offering Iran a choice—nuclear weapons or normal trade, but not both.
It might well work. As Iran scholar Ray Takeyh points out in the journal Survival, there is a vigorous, ongoing debate in Iran over the advantages of having a nuclear capacity. Many within the regime argue that if operating nuclear facilities means isolation from the world economy, that would be too costly and ultimately unnecessary. If Europe threatened sanctions as well as offered rewards, it would strengthen the case of those who want a modern Iran more than they want a nuclear Iran.
This might read like wishful thinking. It requires that Europe be united, bold and decisive. It requires the United States and Europe to coordinate policy closely. But look at what is happening in response to the fraud in Ukraine. Europe is united and has been tough. Washington and Europe are acting together. And if they persevere and refuse to legitimize the election results or deal with the new regime, they will prevail.
There is a lesson here. Despite the surface clashes over the last two years, America and Europe have very similar visions of what kind of world they want. And when the two sides join forces, articulating their common ideals, interests and sense of historical destiny, the combined force is unstoppable.