The story we have been told goes something like this: last Tuesday, on his way back from Israel, President Clinton was notified that Richard Butler, chief of the United Nations weapons-inspections program, had delivered his report to the Security Council. In it, Butler outlined Iraq's persistent blockage of the inspectors and its noncompliance with agreements signed in November. The president's national-security advisers agreed that the United States had to act--and act fast--before Saddam could hide his weapons of mass destruction and disperse his troops. Additionally, Ramadan was to begin on Saturday and it would be "profoundly offensive," in the president's words, to start bombing during Islam's holiest month. The United States had a narrow window of opportunity and took it.

In fact there is no strategic rationale whatever that justifies President Clinton's timing. There is a case for bombing Saddam Hussein's military strongholds, but it is a case that was strong a year ago and a month ago and would be as valid a month from now. In making this abrupt move on the eve of the vote on impeachment, the president further eroded his desperately dwindling supply of credibility--at home and abroad.

Let us start with Butler's report. It contains nothing that the administration--or for that matter the public--has not known for months, even years. Saddam Hussein has been playing a cat-and-mouse game with the inspectors since they began their work seven years ago. (Are you shocked?) Even the specific violations Butler outlined were known to American officials for weeks. The report was a formality.

The argument that Washington had to act soon after the report or else risk evasive action by the Iraqis is incredibly specious. Evasive action where? The report does not contain the location of Saddam's chemical-and biological-weapon development sites. The U.N. team doesn't know where these are; if it did, it would not be seeking the right to engage in random inspections throughout Iraq. "Butler has suspicions; that's about all," says one U.N. official. This hardly provides a blueprint for a strategic-bombing campaign.

Finally there's Ramadan. Some commentators have already pointed out that Syria and Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 during the monthlong holiday. But let's assume that a Western power must be especially sensitive to this issue. Fine. This bombing campaign continued into the start of Ramadan on Saturday. That means the administration's Jesuitical rationale is that it is fine to bomb a Muslim country during the holy month as long as it is a continuing campaign--not the beginning of one. I guess it all depends on what the meaning of the word "bomb" is.

Most importantly, the missile attacks have lacked any clear purpose strategically. They have not been sustained enough to decimate Saddam's conventional forces. And they cannot destroy his weapons of mass destruction: there are no Iraqi factories churning out deadly weapons that the United States can bomb. The danger with Iraq and weapons of mass destruction lies not in the present but in the future. Between the gulf war and the U.N. inspections, Saddam no longer has even a fledgling nuclear capability. Most serious observers also believe that he probably doesn't have much in the way of ongoing chemical or biological facilities, though he may have some such weapons stashed away. In a country as big as Iraq, there is virtually no chance that our bombs will hit these stashes.

But more critically, Saddam probably retains the ability to quickly reconstitute his weapons programs, which is why continuing intrusive inspections is vital. The goal of American policy toward Iraq should be to maintain the tight military containment that deters Iraq from aggression, to weaken Saddam's regime through economic sanctions and to disarm it through constant inspections. President Clinton should have announced that the purpose of the bombings was to destroy Saddam's conventional forces and that the strikes would continue until Iraq allows intrusive inspections again. Without that, the bombings look puny and political.

Had the president not acted in unseemly haste, it would have helped him at home and abroad. Once he received Butler's report he could have begun consultations with allies, members of the Security Council and senators and congressmen. He could have outlined the facts and the need for an international response. In the process of building a coalition, as he did in November, he would have gained international and domestic support for his policy and not appeared to be playing politics with the lives of U.S. servicemen and -women -- not to mention Iraqi civilians. Little would have been lost in terms of targets and tactics; much would have been gained in terms of strategy and credibility.

It is one thing to be reckless in love. It is quite another to be reckless in war.