Historians have begun renaming the cold war, "the long peace." The years from 1945 until today were the longest period of peace among great powers in modern European history. Bipolarity, nuclear weapons and a stable peace settlement, however unjust it was to Central Europeans, ensured that the inevitable crises of world politics became much safer. For all its ideological fire, the cold war was predictable.

Obviously, this year's startling changes beyond the iron curtain speak eloquently of man's desire for freedom and his hatred of tyranny. And obviously, they hold out the prospect of a liberating new life for Central Europe. But history is being made anew, and whenever that happens, and euphoria hangs thick in the air, there lurk as many dangers as hopes.

The two bloodiest wars in human history began in Central Europe, and they began in large part because of the anarchy attending the collapse of a regional power -- the Ottoman Empire before the first world war; the Austro-Hungarian before the second.

Another war is hardly inevitable; in fact it is unlikely. But the decline of the Soviet Union supplies ample reason for caution: not just the worries over German reunification, since the new surges of freedom seem to bring with them old surges of nationalism. In Budapest, street vendors sell maps of "Greater Hungary" -- which includes a hefty chunk of Romania. Otto von Hapsburg, the heir to the Hungarian imperial throne, was seriously considered as a candidate in next year's Hungarian presidential election. Two days ago, German Poles hailed Helmut Kohl as their leader during his visit to Silesia.

The pundits who criticize President Bush for not rushing into this mess with money and new concepts themselves have nothing to offer other than frayed cliches -- "innovation," "seize opportunities," "vision." In fact, the president's calculated inaction is the better part of valor. Dean Acheson, hardly an unimaginative statesman, had similar advice in another revolutionary situation: "Let the dust settle."

The U.S. is not crucially involved in Central Europe. Because of history, proximity and economics, American influence in the region must inevitably be weaker than that of France and West Germany. It is arrogant to presume that the U.S. can "manage" the transformation of communist Europe.

Any steps the superpowers take now will be overwhelmed by events on the ground. Arms control, for instance, runs the risk of becoming a reactionary force, calcifying the process of change. As the superpowers negotiate 350,000 man troop limits, retired Chief of Staff Marshal S.F. Akhromeyevhas ambiguously suggested to Time magazine that under certain conditions (say, if Hungary were to request that Soviet troops withdraw from its territories) all Soviet troops might well leave.

The U.S. can aspire to be "the honest broker" of Europe, and use old-fashioned diplomacy to shape a new balance of power, recognizing that it will not be the balancer itself. Perhaps the Bush team could do this job better than it is now doing, but the U.S. does not need some grand vision. Past efforts at righteous orders--Leagues of Nations, Holy Alliances, Napoleonic empires--have too often raised hopes that backfired into crises and war.

Back to top